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A middle-aged Congolese man stands in front of one of several of his shambas1 located
deep in the Moyens  Plateaux of  the DRC’s  South Kivu Province.  Vibrant  green foliage
largely dominated by a single plant species, surrounds and almost overwhelms the slight
stature of the man. The man holds a wad of cash, intentionally fanned out to the viewer
as evidence of the financial benefits the farmer reaps from the production of the crop he
currently  stands  in  front  of,  a  calculated  answer  to  a  researcher’s  question,  “what
meaning does the cannabis plant hold for your household?”. Despite the country’s well-
reputed resource wealth, existing narratives surrounding the Democratic Republic of the
Congo’s  rich  natural  resource  base  have  largely  attended  to  its  mineral  wealth  and
particularly the link between certain minerals, notably coltan and gold, and the violence
in the region.  The reality  of  which and how natural  resources  matter  in the Congo,
however, is increasingly understood by scholars as much more varied and complex and
requires moving beyond just minerals (Laudati, 2013). During two consecutive summer
field visits in 2017 and again in 2018, farmers from different villages across South Kivu
were given a disposable camera and instructions to photograph their engagement in the
production of cannabis. Aside from an unsurprising stock of personal family photographs,
accidental shots, and a steady supply of the marijuana plant itself, each farmer took care
to set marijuana as the literal and figurative backdrop of their individual and collective
family wealth. In so doing, these farmers subsequently set the scene for the focus of this
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paper, and set in motion a direct challenge to the narrative of violence, delinquency, and
greed that currently foregrounds most discussions of the cannabis economy in Africa. Yet
the surreptitious nature of the photo’s subject and geography, reveals yet another critical
aspect of the cannabis economy. Underlying the photos exhibition of profit lies a more
complicated  story  of  risk,  danger,  and  insecurity,  not  as  it  has  previously  been
understood, but as it shapes the everyday lives of Congolese people.
The  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  is  allegedly  one  of,  if  not  the  most,  significant
producers  of  the  plant,  Cannabis  sativa2 (CIA,  2013;  INCB,  2012) ,  across  the  African
continent today. For many farmers, marijuana serves as the most important crop for their
individual and household’s well-being. As one informant3 noted illustratively, “cannabis
is the cassava of [South Kivu]”. The fact that the DRC is the largest producer of cassava in
Africa after Nigeria and that cassava serves as the staple food and income for 70 percent
of  the  Congolese  population  (Muengula-Manyi  et  al.,  2012)  demonstrates  the  high
importance  credited  to  the  drug.  In  some  cannabis  producing  areas  visited  during
fieldwork close to 90 % of households, or as one village chief suggested, “everyone except
the priests”, rely on income from the trade either as a grower, a trader, or a transporter.
Yet, despite substantive cultivation of the drug in parts of the country, the trade has
failed  to  garner  much  attention,  particularly  regarding  its  significance  for  local
production systems or as a potentially valuable market commodity.
Findings draw from over sixteen months of qualitative fieldwork by the author in South
and North Kivu since 2011 interviewing a range of actors involved in the production and
trade of the plant from growers to sellers to consumers, as well as government officials
and state actors, local NGO and international organization staff, including UN workers.
Data was gathered from nearly twenty different villages and urban centers across the two
eastern provinces and from conversations with civilians as well as army and armed group
personnel  and reflects  a diversity of  perspectives across gender,  ethnicity and socio-
economic status. 
Drawing on the narrated experiences of those involved in the production and trade of the
drug, this paper contributes to a growing literature on the hidden economies of the trade
in marijuana. By focusing on the experiences of those engaged in the trade, this paper
first seeks to challenge the uncritical muddling of cannabis as an illegal and therefore
illegitimate economy (see Abraham and van Schendel, 2005), and bring its oft-ignored
linkages to rural African livelihoods, and in particular, its importance as a key strategy
within  a  diversified  household  economy  (Bloomer,  2009)  from  ‘out  of  the  shadows’
(Laudati,  2014).  While still  maintaining livelihoods as a theoretical  anchor,  the paper
turns  toward understanding these  livelihood struggles  within the context  of  Congo’s
contemporary warscape and explores how the current trade shapes and is shaped by the
region’s continuing insecurity. In doing so, this paper challenges mainstream narratives
that have narrowed the story of the contemporary cannabis trade in the region within
the  confines  of  violence  and  criminality4.  Building  from  recent  work  that  upsets
conventional framing that considers violence as complementary to and thus naturalized
within the workings of the cannabis economy (Suckling, 2016), this paper seeks to further
reframe the cannabis trade as a response to Congo’s landscape of violence rather than a
symptom of it. In particular, it presents evidence of how the plant’s illegality and the
extra-legal networks its illegality engenders is shaping the terms of the trade itself. 
The paper begins with a discussion of the various uses of the plant for individual and
household  consumption.  Starting  with  a  brief  reference  to  its  pre-colonial  use  and
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continuing  up  through  the  present,  this  section  illuminates  the  multiple  uses  and
meanings  of  the plant  by local  Congolese.  The following section explains  the rise  of
cannabis as an illegal substance and how its colonial era demarcation as a dangerous
plant remains, albeit updated and dressed in a modern day framing. The remainder of the
paper settles into an examination of the various ways in which engagement in the trade
engenders new strategies for navigating risk and danger within Congo’s wider landscape
of insecurity. In so doing, it seeks to confront how we understand we understand the very
terms of risk and insecurity as played out in the day-to-day lives of those who navigate
through the hidden economy of Congo’s cannabis trade. 
 
Consuming Cannabis
The story of cannabis consumption and use in the Congo is rooted in a long if indefinite
history. While impossible to date the emergence of cannabis in the country with any
precise accuracy, by the 17th or 18 th century, the consumption of cannabis was widely
accepted  by  the  local  population  (Fabian,  2000),  and  archival  research  suggests  the
existence of, “a thriving industry (Hunt, 2016, p. 69)” at the time of Belgium arrival in the
region.  For  these  earlier  communities,  cannabis  consumption  was  often  interwoven
within ritualistic purposes, as illustrated by the Baluba or Bashilenge5 of Central Congo,
the most recognized of the cannabis smoking cults popular during the mid-nineteenth
century.  More  contemporary  accounts  of  cannabis  use  throughout  the  region
demonstrate that  the tradition of  ritual  cannabis  consumption continues even today.
Cuvelier’s work (2011) on present-day Katanganese Rastafarians, for example, presents
perhaps the most in-depth account of a modern community of cannabis smokers whose
red, green, and gold colored flags are brightly evident throughout the region including
along the streets of South Kivu Province’s capital city, Bukavu. Apart from the drug’s
connection to the Rastafarian movement and rare anecdotal reports of a possible link to
the  magic  incorporated  into  Mai Mai  warfare  practices,  present  day  cannabis
consumption appears less often aligned with ritualistic or even recreational settings than
with a vast array of pharmacological as well as functional uses linked to everyday life. 
Present-day cannabis  consumption typically serves two main functions -  as  a  readily
available and alternative provider of medicine and as a mechanism to cope with day-to-
day  occupational  hardships  and  risks.  Ethno-botanical  studies  conducted  from  1975
onwards in the DRC, for example, note the plant’s use as a relief for childhood illnesses
such as  asthma,  chicken pox and measles,  and as  veterinary  medicine  (Bokdam and
Droogers, 1975; Disengomoka and Delaveau, 1983; Baerts and Lehmann, 1989 and 1991;
Kasonia, 1993; Kalanda and Bolamba, 1994; Byavu et. al., 2000; Balagizi et. al., 2005). Such
studies however are far from exhaustive. Evidence from fieldwork suggests that the plant
serves an even wider range of uses. Interviewees noted the use of the plant to treat a
variety of ailments from cough to ear mites, from snake bites to hernia, from skin disease
to the plague, or mixed with salt as a remedy against livestock disease, and particularly
for the treatment of traditional diseases such as kivubo6. Some households also reported
using the ash of the plant for treating and healing wounds, and as a salve to assist with
the cutting of the umbilical cord during birth. In most cases of household use, only the
leaves  or  flowers  of  the  plant  are  used,  whereas  traditional  healers  are  known  to
incorporate other parts of the plant such as the stalk in the treatment of kifafa (epilepsy).
Recent work by Roulette et al. (2016; see also Roulette and Hewlett, 2018) looking at the
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high prevalence of cannabis consumption among the Aka forest-forager group suggests it
serves  as  a  self-medication  against  helminths  (intestinal  worms).  Equally  important,
cannabis’s ability to provide stamina and ‘courage on the job’ was widely cited by study
participants as the primary motivation for taking cannabis among Congolese men (see
also Laniel, 2006; York, 2012). As a police officer in Sange noted, “Marijuana helps us not
to fall asleep when we are patrolling. In addition, it gives us strength to face delinquent
persons with whom we meet at night”. A state military soldier in the Forces Armées de la
République  Démocratique  du Congo (FARDC) adds,  “In addition,  when patrolling,  we are
always beaten by the cold, but when you have your hemp you will smoke it the whole
night while patrolling and you will  not feel cold”.  Writing in the mid-70s,  Carl Sagan
noted a similar usage among the Mbuti ethnic group that “helps to make the long waits…
tolerable  [in  the]  patient  stalking  and  hunting  of  mammals  and  fish  (1977,  p.191
footnote)” – a finding similar to observations made by Hewlett (1977) of the Mbuti, as well
as the Efe and Aka forest-forager groups. The same stamina-enduring properties cited by
security agents and reported independently by Sagan (1977) and Hewlett (1977), have
made the drug particularly popular among laborers such as artisanal miners who often
endure horrific conditions and suffer long hours of difficult and dangerous work. As a
captain from the Congolese army related, “from my experience [having been stationed] at
Kasii,  if  you  want  to  get  someone  to  dig  [for  minerals],  you  have  to  give  digging
equipment as well as cannabis – it's a provision, like nourriture (food)”. 
The drug presents a similar function within Congo’s landscape of continuing violence as
well. Among Congolese soldiers, for example, the consumption of cannabis serves as a
mechanism to cope with the daily hardships of the job, hunger, and to reduce fear in
combat (Eriksson-Baas and Stern,  2010).  Additionally,  the drug is  frequently given to
fighters from either side of the battlefield in order to stimulate their desire to fight or
make them unaware of danger,  or,  after a battle,  ease the pain of injury or extreme
tension  caused  by  confrontation,  particularly  in  the  case  of  hand-to-hand  combat.
Furthermore, the drug’s relevance within the DRC’s current landscape of insecurity is not
limited to those directly engaged in the region’s violence. For example, Babaembe cattle
keepers of Fizi territory, where village raids by pillaging forces are common, testify to
using the plant in order to protect their cattle through what is known locally as ijunguu 
– the disappearance – which reportedly makes cows invisible to potential looters. Thus,
although early appreciations for the drug centered on its consumption and notably its
“most voluptuous sensation” (Timbs, 1890, p. 231), its significance and use within modern
Congolese society has since diversified and continues to be adapted in different ways to
fit the changing context and realities of Congolese life, including its violent landscape. 
 
The Making of a Dangerous Plant
Despite  the  drug’s  historical  ties  to  the  region, today  the  production,  sale,  and
consumption of  cannabis  are regarded as  criminal  acts  punishable  by law.  Following
regulations accorded by The Hague Convention of 1912,  cannabis laws in Congo were
enacted in 1917 (INL, 2011) by the colonial tribunal, which put into law “repression of the
cultivation, consumption, and sale of Indian cannabis” (Dembour, 2000, p. 86). As Duvall
(2017) notes,  cannabis-control  laws,  enacted with the stated aim of  improving native
health, preserving labor quality, and preventing crime (Williams and Warf, 2017), were in
fact  motivated in  service  of  Europe’s  civilizing mission (controlling native  labor  and
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religious proselytizing) – of which African cannabis was considered a hindrance to. Based
upon historical records of high imprisonment ratios during this time period, Bernault
(2007) argues, the decree of the cultivation of cannabis along with a range of other acts by
the French and Belgium Colonial governments as a punishable offense in 1910 was in fact
a deliberate tactic to further the “criminalization of native life... through administrative
and short-term sentences [which] thus provided tremendous leverage for taking hold of
the colonised and for controlling local economies and native labour (p. 63)”. While the
use of these indigénats coincided with wider political-economic issues,  namely the tax
demands already placed on African populations, a concurrent subsistence crises and the
slow  increase  in  monetary  circulation  that  made  fines  unrealistic  sentences,  they
nevertheless were part of an “intense policy of taming... resistance to white domination”
(p. 66). The use, cultivation, and trade of cannabis, as argued by Nancy Rose Hunt (2016),
was  deliberately  singled  out  because  it  signalled  defiance  on  behalf  of  the  native
population.  As  she  describes,  cannabis  diverted  attention  away  from  the  preferred
colonial task of copal production, which was linked to the colonial monies needed to pay
taxes. Stated otherwise by a local chief at the time, many did not want to collect copal
because  hemp  offered  them  another  lucrative  resource.  In  response,  the  colonial
administration ordered military campaigns to uproot cannabis plants, which were seen as
a threat to colonial economic interests. “The plant”, she contends, “was like a currency
with commercial  sway,  while its many powers made it  a symbol and fact of  dissent”
(p. 70). By 1940, campaigns against cannabis drug use had pushed human engagement
with the drug almost entirely underground (Duvall, 2017). The role of cannabis does not
feature  prominently  in  the  country’s  historical  record  again  until  the  period  of
independence7. 
The laws regarding the sale, consumption and production of the plant, have remained the
same since they were codified in 1917. Rather, arguably only the terms of how it has been
constituted  a  dangerous  plant  has  changed.  Once  seen  as  dangerous to  the  colonial
project by presenting colonial subjects a path towards economic self-sufficiency, today it
is seen as a resource that contributes to the region’s violence in two central ways. Firstly,
marijuana  is  seen as  serving  largely  as  a  funding  mechanism for  rebel  groups.  This
approach bases marijuana’s importance to armed groups solely on the logic of extraction
or harvesting for exchange. The ability of some armed groups, notably various Mai-Mai
groups and more so, the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), to profit from
the trade was aptly expressed by a United Nations Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)
officer stationed in Bukavu, “If you smoke marijuana, you support the FDLR”8.
A second approach centers on the psychophysiological effects of drugs on fighters and in
particular how through the embodied practice of consuming the drug, the enabling of,
particularly  young,  recruits  to  fight  with  and  on  behalf  of  armed  groups,  becomes
possible. More recently, cannabis has been blamed for “diminish[ing] moral responsibility
and increas[ing] violent tendencies” (ITUC, 2013), “thus…fuel[ing] much of the sexualized
violence  committed  in  the  DRC”  (Women  Under  Siege,  2012).  In  response  to  these
discursive  narratives  that  place  marijuana  alongside  and  partially  culpable  for  the
region’s violence, insecurity, delinquency, and greed, NGOs, international bodies such as
the AU and UN, as well as state agents continue to call for the drug’s absolute abolition.
Even regionally sourced media reports seem to be pre-occupied with headlining seizures
of the illegal substance9. Official statements, buoyed by sensationalist international NGO
campaigns and regional media reporting, are further displayed through occasional anti-
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drug performances in which sacks of cannabis are publicly burned in Congo’s largest
cities, such as Goma and Bukavu – a strikingly familiar picture that harkens back to the
piles of ivory burned under Kenyan President Moi’s regime in the 1990s. It is no surprise
then  that  many  Congolese  today  view  participants  in  the  trade  and  their  smoking
beneficiaries as “delinquent” or “criminal.” Yet conversations with local Congolese across
the  socio-political  spectrum  demonstrates  that  views  of  the  drug’s  relationship  to
violence in the region are much more nuanced. 
Community and civilian perspectives derive largely from one’s involvement or lack of
involvement with the trade. For example, Rastafarian groups, well-known smokers (if not
occasional traders and growers themselves) of the drug present a sharp contrast to the
views extended along official and international lines. As one Rastafarian chief related,
“On the contrary, hemp contributes to security in the city in the way that we Rasta men
are the ones who take care of the main road when there is a broken place that can cause
damage to [vehicle] passengers. You will never hear a Rasta man fighting in such a such
area for they are well-bred/instructed”. Interestingly, this later claim refers to a series of
free  local  trainings  for  Rastafarians  conducted  in  his  area  “so  that  they  might  not
misbehave towards others” – instituted in direct response to counter the “bad reputation
and renown” that hemp smokers generally carry. 
Yet even those involved in the trade who suggest that there may indeed be a link between
the physiological effects of the drug and violence in the region, suggest that additional
facts likely play a much more significant role. As nicely summed up by one informant, “
the heads of people differ”. “Rather”, another informant explained, “the insecurity in the
area is related to someone’s interests. When someone wants to become a colonel in the
army and he decides to go in the bush to start his own rebellion or militia, it is not the
hemp which took him there, it is the interests he seeks in order to achieve his life goals”. 
More so, according to informants, it is alcohol that is more often associated with violence
in  the  region  than  marijuana.  Despite  these  assertions,  involvement  in  the  trade
continues to carry a negative stigma – a mark that is both politically inscribed by actors
at  the  national  and  international  level  as  well  as  socially  inscripted  through  local
institutions. 
As  many  interviewees  related,  views  of  the  drug  and  some  people’s  subsequent
engagement in the trade, are shaped not only by observation and experience with drug-
users  but  are  additionally  influenced  by  socio-cultural  norms  and  beliefs.  A  grower
relates how, “My wife does not help me in any work concerning [the growing or selling of
cannabis]. From the growing season up to the time I sell it, I do all the work alone, as she
considers this work as sinful for her Assemblies of God belief forbids her to get involved
in illegal things”. Adherence to different branches of Christianity was often cited as a
barrier for some accessing the trade. In surely an ironic twist, one grower reported taking
up smoking, “in order to forget all what happened to me in the church,” following his
excommunication – a direct result of the church authorities discovering his involvement
in  the  trade. Given  this  broader  socio-political  milieu  in  which  cannabis  and  its
prohibition as a dangerous commodity is embedded, involvement in the trade is often
seen as the result of “having no [other] choice” – a situation linked to the region’s wider
landscape of food insecurity and lack of alternative livelihoods. 
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Working within a Landscape of (Food) Insecurity
When  asked  about  why  individuals  became  involved  in  the  trade,  the  majority  of
respondents set their answers against a backdrop of poverty, regional underdevelopment,
and government neglect. Over the last 15 years, almost continual instability and a state of
periodic violence have come to characterize the eastern region of the Congo, weakening
the  rural  economy.  Agricultural  production,  which  serves  as  the  primary  economic
activity for 80 % of rural households, has decreased in the past decade (Vlassenroot et al.,
2003) contributing to a cycle of food and nutritional insecurity (Kandala et al., 2011), low
food production and subsequent extreme poverty (Rossi et al., 2006) while parts of the
region,  notably  the  landlocked  Moyens  and  Hauts  Plateaux,  have  grown  increasingly
isolated (ICRC, 2010). Limited access to land and markets, as well as post-war government
neglect of the region have aggravated these conditions (van Acker, 2005; Ulimwengu et al
., 2009; see also Ragasa and Ulimwengu, 2011). Thus while continuing insecurity in the
region prevents many farmers from regularly accessing their  farms to tender higher
maintenance crops such as the water thirsty leaves of amaranth greens, known locally as
lenga-lenga, retarded state agricultural programs have done little to alleviate reports of
spreading diseases in the region’s most important staple crops, cassava (cassava root rot)
and  bananas/plantains  (banana  wilt).  As  a  result,  more  than  60 %  of  the  current
population is labelled as food insecure (Walangululu et al., 2011) and more than 70 % of
farmers are categorized as poor (Dowiya et al., 2009). The continuing deprivation facing
Congolese farmers and herders amidst these wider challenges, has led to, as Cox (2011,
p. 247) argues,  “diminishing returns of  agrarian life”.  At the same time,  these trends
towards increasing rural poverty and decreasing food production, have coincided with
reported  increases  in  the  illicit  crop  production of  the  drug  – a  likely  outcome and
adaptive  response  to  the  region’s  persistent  insecurity  and  the  reported  growing
numbers of the country’s food insecure. 
A study conducted in the late 1990s with support from the Kinshasan Association for the
Prevention of Substance Abuse (LIPILDRO) noted even then an increase in local cannabis
production. The average land area under cannabis cultivation reportedly increased from
one to three hectares. In some areas, 60 % of farmers had introduced cannabis into their
production system (Labrousse, 2014). Indeed, households often grow cannabis in addition
to traditional food crops and empirical data from interviews suggest that crop diseases
and insecurity  have played the leading role  in lowering food security  in the region.
Multiple  sources  have  presented  little  variation  in  retelling  local  experiences  of
insecurity such that,  “in the past fifteen years,  there were no diseases affecting food
crops, but nowadays they are too many that reduce plant productivity, particularly the
disease known as Mosiac for cassava and bananas”,  and “before when there were no
plants diseases, we made money from those food crops but since the time the diseases
came, we do not get money from those crops anymore and even to get food to eat has
become a serious problem to us”, “whereas”, a third informant explains, “hemp has no
disease”. While few households grow cannabis almost exclusively, many rely on cannabis
as a supplementary crop during periods when other major food staples, such as cassava,
which take ten to twelve months to mature, are not ready to be harvested or whose
harvests have declined. Cannabis thus provides the very ‘cushion’ against food crisis at
the household level (see Laniel, 2006). 
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In addition to diminishing returns on agricultural  and notably food crop production,
many  felt  their  engagement  with  the  trade  was  further  precipitated  by  the  lack  of
alternative income-earning opportunities. Such statements parallel statistics gathered at
the macro level, which show that the DRC is one of the most expensive countries in the
world  where  to  establish  a  business  (Lamb,  2011).  Significant  structural  and process
barriers in the form of poor governance, multiple informal and formal levies, difficulties
in securing loans, and widespread corruption translate into high start-up costs and a
formidable bureaucracy that prevents the average DRC resident from establishing and
maintaining not only a formal sector business but also from gaining entry into other low-
level  occupations.  When  asked  why  civilian  traders  and  growers  entered  into  the
cannabis trade versus other profitable or domestic trades such as the mineral economy,
the remote location of minerals featured as a major deterrent but equally important was
the  lack  of  start-up  capital  necessary  to  dig  minerals.  As  one  informant  described,
starting capital was not the only financial consideration. “It requires someone who knows
minerals, much money to go with and another amount to leave to one’s wife so that when
you spend three months without sending anything, she should not bother you”.
Preference for engaging in cannabis production in particular, over a host of potential
informal  economies  and namely  markets  of  other  agricultural  commodities,  depends
upon the ecology of the plant as much as the socio-political context in which the trade
operates. Cannabis, a robust plant that is easy to grow, requires little labor outside of
harvesting and drying, can yield more than one harvest per year, and can be harvested as
early as six months from sowing, thus providing farmers an ecologically efficient as well
as an economically effective crop that “even in spite of law enforcement problems […]is a
miracle solution for peasants” (Labrousse, 2014).
 
Congo’s Green Gold
Depending on the level of engagement the range of profits that can be realized at an
individual level are quite varied. Few growers, for example, gain much benefit from the
trade beyond a household subsistence level  earning roughly $200-$1000USD per year
– expressed by informants as enough to meet the “elementary needs” of “feeding my
children, buying clothes for them, paying for their studies” and the occasional purchase
of livestock such as goats and cows, or having some cash “when your kid is sick you can
buy medicine”. The greatest profits accrue to traders, particularly cross-border traders,
those linked to wealthier or foreign buyers (including international NGO staff and UN
affiliates who purchase the drug at a premium price), and higher ranked soldiers in the
Congolese army. One military trader,  in explaining why a fellow FARDC member was
more successful  than he,  which allowed his  friend to  purchase two motorcycles  and
provided the capital to start a small shop in the city, noted, “as a captain commander…he
has a higher ranking than me”. If one can manage the dangers of crossing into Burundi,
selling directly to outside markets can bring in as much as three times more income, then
it is no wonder that an active trans-border trade exists. As a recent UNODC report (2011,
p. 42) notes, under such lucrative circumstances, “onward trafficking seems a rational
choice”. 
The extent to which individuals are able to profit from the trade is further shaped by the
region’s  insecurity.  As  most  cultivators  of  cannabis  harvest  their  crop  at  the  same
climatic period,  following the end of  the wet seasons (between September and May),
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farmers unintentionally end up flooding the marijuana market with their product at the
same time during the months of June, July and August. As a result, prices for marijuana
are cheapest during this period and subsequently rise the further from the day of harvest
until the next harvest period. At first glance this might appear to be the result of local
enviro-climatic conditions. However, the key to understanding why farmers and traders
sell  their  marijuana  in  the  marketplace  at  the  same time requires  asking  not  when
marijuana is largely produced (an enviro-climatic condition) but why cannabis is put on
the market when it is (a socio-political condition). Because cannabis is not a perishable
product, once dried, it can be stored up to six months with little reduction in potency.
Farmers often acknowledged the benefit that selling during the dry season would provide
but  felt  constrained  by  a  number  of  factors  preventing  them  from  waiting  to  sell.
Variations of the response, poverty, presented the major factor influencing farmers to
sell quickly after harvest but also fear being caught with sacks of marijuana at home was
also  noted  as  an  additional  condition  that  prompted  farmers  to  quickly  sell.  Thus
concerns over illegal product seizure and arrest presented a key obstacle for gaining
better profits as the need to get cash quickly forced farmers to harvest when the cannabis
was not yet ripe (and thus would fetch a lower price on the market), to sell when the
market already had a ready supply of the drug, and to sell cheaply to the initial buyer. As
one trader explained, “I do not always sell my hemp for the same price due to the fact
that the price varies depending on the quantity of hemp that is in the market and also on
the security in the area. If there is a high level of security in the area, the hemp sale price
goes down, for buyers are buying by not being sure of achieving it all during the retail
sale”. Even for rural households where accumulation is limited, however, the impact of
this illicit trade for individual and household welfare should not be underestimated. 
The  implications  of  the  trade  for  improving  the  material  development  of  rural
households  is  particularly  evident  during  transactions  that  involve  the  exchange  of
material goods in lieu of cash payments for supplies of cannabis. In an environment of
poor infrastructure, road networks that become impassable for months out of the year,
and the general insecurity of travel in the region, these exchanges are one way that
isolated communities get access to a range of subsistence goods, as well as manufactured
and luxury items. Items exchanged range widely but common items mentioned include;
raincoats, coats, phones, clothes, boots, beer, soft drinks, small fish, mboga (vegetables but
also a general term for anything used to garnish the staple of cassava flour), radios, salt,
soap, flashlights, plates, iron sheeting, and plastic sheeting. As one grower from Mubaka
noted, “those who come from the city and come to buy [cannabis] sometimes bring other
items [to exchange] besides money. So sometimes I make little money but I never miss
[getting] trousers or food”. Some growers even stated a preference for receiving goods
over cash payments while several informants noted making special requests to traders to
bring specific goods on occasion. One informant, for example, related how he exchanged
his  sacks  of  cannabis  for  solar  panels  – which  he  uses  to  generate  electricity  and
subsequently runs one of the few sources of television in the high plateau west of Bukavu.
Far from serving solely as a compensation crop or a ‘cushion’ during periods of instability
or  due  to  a  breakdown  in  wider  structural  factors,  cannabis  holds  a  much  more
substantial position even within a regulated rural economy. Notably, cannabis fuels the
licit economy through invested surplus and through a barter system that brings a level of
development  to  marginalised  rural  areas  and provides  the  means  to  maintain  social
norms and order (including accessing the funds necessary to get married and build a
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home). The profits earned from the cannabis trade are invested in the future (school fees;
dowry; small  business start-up),  asset creation (livestock; property;  infrastructure),  as
well as present household needs (clothing; household goods; food). That the benefits of




While  armed groups  and  FARDC members  of  various  ranks  –  ranging  from top  end
officials to the rank and file of the unranked soldiers – are involved in the trade, an
equally if not more diverse range of civilian actors - representing differences in gender,
ethnic  group,  socio-economic  class,  age,  marriage  status,  origin,  occupation,  even
physical capability – also trade. The inclusion of women is particularly noteworthy. As
similarly noted in recent work (see for example Vogel and Musamba, 2017; Perks et al.,
2018)  examining  women’s  roles  and  male  identification  of  female  spaces  in  mining
communities,  women  occupy  positions  and  spaces  in  the  production  and trade  of
marijuana  in  various  ways  as  transporters,  traders,  and  less  so  as  assistants  in  the
planting  and weeding  stages  of  cultivation.  Some male  informants  actually  seek  the
assistance of their wives for transporting marijuana as women are seen as being less
likely to be arrested, while one trader explains why he chooses to sell alongside his wife,
because,  “[security  forces]  cannot  arrest  both  the  husband  and  the  wife  at  once”.
Regardless of the veracity of that claim, women’s main occupation within the cannabis
economy is as a trader. In neighboring Rwanda, for example, Emmanual Ngondo, director
of Anti-Narcotics at Rwandan National Police, states that women make up the largest
percentage of traders trafficking the drugs (Kaitesi, 2012). While women account for a
large percentage of the sellers in South and North Kivu as well, many of these women are
FARDC soldier’s wives (Anon., 2014), a fact that is also noted by the United Nations Group
of  Experts  on the Congo (2011).  Soldiers’  wives  interviewed for  this  study cast  their
participation against a backdrop of the low monthly salaries that sometimes arrives each
month but which more often does not (see also Eriksson-Baas and Stern, 2010). Thus, with
their  husband’s  permission  (and  frequently  also  with  their  encouragement  and
assistance) wives enter the trade in order to supplement their husband’s meagre wages.
While women not affiliated with the FARDC also trade, they make up a much smaller
percentage as FARDC wives hold a competitive advantage over civilian women through
their very association as FARDC wives. Yet while this affiliation presents a fair level of
protection, it is certainly one that is not guaranteed (see for example Kimbale, 2013). 
As Cuvelier (2011) notes in his look at businesswomen in Katanga, trading activities in
general  serve  to  provide  women  greater  financial  autonomy  and  to  gain  a  better
bargaining position vis-à-vis their husbands. But even these femmes d’affaires often rely on
start-up  money  from  their  husband’s  or  parents.  This  explicit  bias  against  female
participation in business was formalized in the country’s legal framework that disallowed
married women from getting a job, starting a business, securing a loan, signing a contract
or initiating legal proceedings in the DRC without permission of their husbands (Mbambi
and Faray-Kele,  2010)10.  In  the  absence  of  marital  and  familial  support  systems,  the
cannabis  trade,  which  requires  less  start-up  capital  than  traditional  market  trades,
provides  a  financially  suitable  alternative for  other  marginalized groups who do not
benefit from the security that marriage provides. Prostitutes, widows, and handicapped
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women are also known to benefit from the trade’s inclusive nature. While prostitutes
(who have FARDC officials as clients) and widows of former FARDC officers, like their
counterpart  FARDC  wives,  may  also  gain  some  competitive  advantage  over  civilian
women, these social networks are often unpredictable and can change quickly, particular
for widowed wives whose advantage quickly deteriorates after their husband’s death. 
The  inclusion  of  FARDC  wives  as  well  as  a  broader  category  of  civilian  women
demonstrates that far from the traffic being the purview of doped-up youth gangs, petty
criminals, warlords, or corrupt officials, a substantial percentage of the trade is made up
by everyday citizens, many of whom rely on the trade to meet basic requirements not
being met at  the household (through other means)  or national  level.  In particular it
provides an alternative source of income to social groups who otherwise are excluded
from other traditional licit sources of income. In addition to widows and prostitutes (of
soldiers  or  otherwise),  the  trade  also  provides  opportunities  to  the  physically
handicapped whose abnormalities prevent them from entering into more traditional but
physically demanding occupations such as artisanal mining, agriculture, and even legal
market trading that nevertheless still requires mobility and strength. While some traders
I met attributed their handicaps to the war, these were often demobilized FARDC fighters
who had sustained incapacitating leg injuries. Much more common were men and women
whose abnormalities were the result of congenital defects, childhood disease, or later
adulthood  infections  that  were  never  properly  treated.  One  popular  trader  in  Uvira
territory, for example, revealed how her entry into the trade was partially the result of a
severe rounded back protuberance typical of kyphosis that hindered her ability to access
other opportunities including the security of marriage. 
Physical disabilities, not only serve as a factor shaping entry into the trade but as several
informants  noted,  the  same  qualities  that  present  a  hindrance  to  participation  in
conventional trades, can prove to be a beneficial asset in the illegal trade. Asked about his
entry into the trade, a trader points to his physical disability, “It’s been about eighteen
years since I started trading [marijuana]…I had decided to start growing it when I lost all
my fingers due to disease. There was no way for me to work anymore. Thus, I got involved
in this trade”. Describing how he has managed to avoid arrest during his time as a trader,
he again draws on his disability as an important factor,  “When the soldiers come to
realize that I am fingerless; they decided not to arrest me for this is the only way through
which I can get money for my survival”. 
 
Navigating Risk 
Just as the criminalization of the plant has shaped the demographics of those who choose
to become involved in the trade, their ability to circumvent the dangers of doing business
within this illicit economy depends partly on their ability to subscribe to a new set of
growing and selling strategies. In particular, success in the trade relies on the ability of
individual growers and sellers “hiding themselves” – a consideration that begins with the
location of one’s marijuana field. If one were to map the regional location of cannabis
farms, some patterns could easily be identified. In particular, most growing areas are
geographically concentrated in the more isolated regions of South and North Kivu, such
as the Moyens and Hauts  Plateaux,  those that are further from roads as well  as urban
centers. Other patterns might be harder to discern without additional information. Some
growing areas, for example, benefit for being in close proximity to mining areas, yet still
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far from the provincial capitals, such as the areas around the mining center of Masisi
Town. Even less obvious are the locations of individual marijuana plots even if specific
villages,  and even exact household locations have been determined precisely because
individual hemp fields are often located far from grower’s households and separate from
the agricultural fields used to grow other crops. Despite the plants ability to grow well
with other crops,  farmers often forego inter-cropping cannabis with other household
crops. As one farmer explains, “I do not mix [cannabis with my food crops] because I
often fear maybe the soldiers can identify my field and will uproot everything in the
field”. Thus the separation of food crops from cannabis ensures that, even in the event of
discovery, no subsistence plants go the way of seized cannabis harvests. Fear of having
one’s marijuana plot discovered, however, is not limited to being discovered by security
agents. As another farmer explains, “I do not mix [cannabis] with any other crop because
many people will see that hemp if I mix it with food crops, which could compromise its
production, for many people will come to know [that I am growing hemp], for they will
see  it  because  the  food  crop  fields  we  usually  cultivate  are  in  open  spaces  where
everybody passes. Whereas hemp, it is always cultivated in hidden places and that is the
difference”. For the same reason, farms of cannabis plants are usually not weeded despite
its benefit for increasing plant development and production, "since weeding clears the
field, making it such that any one from far away can identify that it is hemp [that you are
growing]”. Fields of hemp are however often intermixed with other [limited value] weedy
plants. As noted by another grower, “when marijuana grows with other plants that we do
not use in our lives, it will be difficult for most people to determine what is growing
inside the field from far away”.  The fear of  being discovered shapes not only where
cannabis farms are located and how the plant is cultivated within the local environment,
it also shapes how labor in the production of cannabis is structured. 
Unlike the production of food crops that draws on multiple field hands in the various
stages of planting, weeding, and harvesting, labor in the production of the cannabis plant
is  often  done  by  a  single  individual  – that  of  the  cannabis  owner  himself.  As  one
informant noted, “the land cultivation, the acquisition of seed, the harvest time and the
sale period, no one from my family helps me do it”. Another farmer explains, “the harvest
time does not involve other people as we usually do in other crops since [those laboring
on your marijuana farm] may spread the news that you are a hemp grower and besides
many will  not  agree to  come to  help you for  they know that  to  do so  is  to  expose
themselves to danger”. Thus, cultivators often keep their farms secret even from other
villagers  and  neighbors,  whom  several  respondents  noted  might  retaliate  for  past
transgression or to settle an unresolved conflict. As articulated by one grower, “no one
knows the place [where I grow marijuana] except myself… they do not know my field
because I do not want them to know it…if they come to know the [location of the] field
they might plot with security members to arrest me, for one cannot trust anyone in this
world”. While the involvement of their wives in the production of marijuana was often
linked to claims of their “fearfulness” or as previously noted, their religious devotion, for
some growers, not involving their wives represented a similar strategy for remaining
safe. “[Wives] they do not want to be arrested. But they are the first to ask for the money
you have received [from the sale of marijuana]. And if you want to get arrested easily,
please ask your wife to help you in that business for the day you quarrel with them, hemp
is the only thing she will be claiming to be in your head that troubles you, and from there
everybody will know that you are a hemp grower or smoker”.
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Strategies for staying safe also shape how and where people store their harvest, when and
how transport of cannabis to the market is accomplished, and to whom and in what
quantity cannabis is grown and sold. Most respondents, for example, cited some variation
of “hiding” or “burying” their sacks of harvested cannabis prior to selling them – an
activity that usually occurs in the fields rather than in the household and remains there
until  a destination for their hemp is determined. As a similar precaution, buyers are
usually not permitted to arrive directly at growers’ fields but to an agreed upon meeting
place  for  the  exchange.  During  transportation,  marijuana  is  often  hidden  through
packaging that involves layering either clothing or charcoal that “[are] put on the bottom
and [sic] others on the top of the sack so [the marijuana can]not to be easily identified”.
Some traders also spray their sacks with perfume in order to mask the strong smell that
marijuana typically  emits.  That  the smell  much more so than the plants  visibility  is
repeatedly noted as a major factor within the narratives of those who have been caught,
confirms the significance of this strategy. 
Remaining  hidden  necessitates  strategies  that  reduce  visibility  but  also  tactics  that
reduce exposure. The desire on the part of both growers and traders to reduce exposure
shapes the quantity that growers produce and the quantity by which traders sell by. “The
insecurity”,  one  grower  lamented,  “is the  main  element  that  prevents  us  from  not
growing more. For the more you grow the more it is dangerous to you because you will
have to sell it to different places and that is how it will become dangerous to you”. A
trader similarly relates, “I do not want to sell by boules11 because to do so is to expose
oneself to multiple risks”. Most marijuana thus tends to be transported and sold from the
site of production in larger qualities of 30, 50, or 100 kg sacks in order to reduce the
number  of  buyers  and thus  minimize  the  risk  to  growers  of  exposure  by  others.  In
addition, the fear of exposure strongly influences sellers’ decisions of whom they will or
will not trade with. Some traders, for example, refuse to trade with soldiers whom they
see as capable of “plot[ing] against me”. As one seller explained, “I sell it to civilians only
because I do not want to put myself at risk. Soldiers are always complicated and do not
have friends. When he is moneyless, he is your friend but when he has money he becomes
otherwise”.  Others  spoke  of  the  need  to  be  cautious  to  any  potential  new  buyer
particularly  in  light  of  the  well-known practice  of  security  agents  pretending  to  be
buyers.  The  concern  of  exposure  also  shapes  the  strategies  people  use  to  transport
marijuana  to  their  intended  destination/buyer.  Some,  for  example,  choose  to  travel
during nighttime as they argue it presents a cover with which to more safely move by,
whiles others do not travel at night for fear of meeting with ‘evil spirits’. 
Strategies for staying safe and reducing risk of exposure and potentially of arrest, are
thus  multiple  and  varied.  Yet  while  informants  lamented  the  dangers  encountered
though their engagement in the cannabis economy, most informants recognized that
within the trade a certain level of risk was to be expected. As one big trader noted, “When
you start [any type of] work you also must accept its risks. It is like someone who loves a
woman and wants her to be his wife but does not want her family-in-law. Or you want to
be a fisherman but ignore the risks of drowning, or capsizing”. For most traders then, a
key factor for being able to successfully navigate the multiple dangers and risks in the
trade was often expressed as individual character traits such as mafu mafu12 (fearlessness)
and ndabitwaza13 (without worry). Even amongst those who claimed to have the “heart of
a lion” however, one risk in particular presented itself as a formidable and the most
significant  challenge  across  all  respondents’  stories.  As  one  informant  offered  in
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summary, “there is much risk when going to sell because you do a movement. Harvesting,
growing or weeding holds some risk but not as much as bringing it to market”. 
 
Negotiating Danger
Speaking on the role of the tobacco plant in Southern Lebanon, which exhibits similar
ecologically and economically beneficial qualities, Khayatt (2012, p. 477) privileges the
plant as a ‘war-i-time success’, a distinction that can similarly be applied to the role of
cannabis in the DRC’s current landscape of ‘no war no peace’. Its ecology (a hardy plant;
easy to grow; amenable to interplanting; and relatively fast growing) means that it is
attuned to the spatio-temporal parameters of Congo’s warscape (both for victims as a
compensation crop, as a source of food security when other crops such as the staple
cassava take longer to cultivate, and also to armed groups who can easily grow it. At the
same  time,  the  same  characteristics  that  factor  into  its  success  to  suit  the  Congo’s
warscape and in light of its illegality– its disparate and distant character (being diffuse,
and being remote) in order to be hidden – it requires a complex set of social relations to
get  from  grower  to  trader  to  consumer  which  in  turn  means  that  such  relations
consequently shape the very socio-temporal parameter of the trade and the landscape of
violence itself.  For example, the same qualities that promote the armed group FDLR’s
ability to engage in production, notably geographic isolation, also stand as barriers to the
group’s  ability  to  participate  in  the  commercialization  end  of  the  drug’s  trade,
necessitating that the group collaborate with members of the military and other armed
groups against whom they are said to be fighting. For citizens involved in the trade, it is
in “navigating the war terrain” (Vigh, 2016) that the greatest insecurity associated with
the trade lies.
The engagement in an illegal trade in an area of weak state oversight and control means
that traders must navigate the physical crossing of a landscape of insecurity as well as a
complex socio-political landscape of insecurity. When asked about the dangers associated
with the trade, citizens unanimously cited that the greatest risk faced by growers and
traders  was  often  met  ‘along  the  way’.  These  largely  random  and  unpredictable
encounters occur during the transport phase when traders and growers are moving sacks
of marijuana from the area of cultivation to its first location of sale and are met by
individual members of armed militias or FARDC soldiers literally ‘along the way’. While
these meetings are commonly seen as  being ‘random’  and occurring ‘by chance’,  (as
opposed  to  ‘legal’  checkpoints  patrolled  and  enforced  by  the  FARDC)  many  of  the
encounters  with  individual  army  members,  in  particular,  occur  where  military
checkpoints or bases have been established nearby. During such encounters, transporters
may be arrested, have their goods seized, or be asked to pay a fine in lieu of an arrest. In
some  cases,  multiple  scenarios  happen  simultaneously,  for  example,  when  military
members and individuals from armed group walk away with the sacks of marijuana along
with  any  cash being  carried  on the  individual’s  person.  Even in  instances  of  arrest,
however, after paying a settlement for their release, few traders were ever actually sent
on further to the regional prison. While such episodes appear like nothing more than
outright cases of banditry and pillage, most interactions do not end leaving transporters
in absolute destitution for the very reason that such encounters are mirrors of social
relations as much as they are influenced by the search for personal profit. 
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The ability of each actor to secure access to and successfully compete in the cannabis
trade, is rooted in their economic and political capacity to manipulate varying personal
relations and networks. Familial, customary, friendly and ethnic relations were all cited
as  necessary  precursors  to  entering potential  areas  to  acquire  tradable  quantities  of
cannabis.  Strong and extensive social  networks are so valued in the trade that when
participants were asked to list the qualities that define a successful trader, two of the six
characteristics provided spoke directly to one’s social networks while an additional two
were closely linked to strong social endowments. According to respondents, the success
of a trader depends on (1) their recognition by others as a trader; (2) their fearlessness (3)
their experience, intelligence, and knowledge of the trade; (4) the quantity of cannabis
traded;  (5)  their  connections to FARDC;  and (6)  their  ability to move across national
borders to access more profitable international markets. Thus to be a successful cannabis
trader in the Congo requires more than attention to numerical accounts of goods sold or
profits gained but rests on the possession of strong social capital to gain access to a wide
clientele and to build the connections necessary to minimize the risks of engaging in an
illicit trade. Ironically then, success in the business of one of Congo’s most notorious
shadow economy requires for traders not to be hidden, but rather “to be known”. 
To  clarify  however,  this  requires  that  traders  are  known  by  the  appropriate  social
networks and individuals and that this act of ‘knowing’ is couched in terms of reciprocity.
Traders intentionally develop ‘friendships’ by gifting small quantities of cannabis and
sometimes other goods such as beer and/or cash to individual armed group members
which is key to securing safe passage and avoid arrest.  As a village chief and grower
explains, “I stay safe in the area because I often make myself a friend of soldiers and
commanders. Most of the time, when there is a soldier who is in my area, he first of all
must come to show himself  up to me as the chief,  after I  ask him if  he also smokes
cigarettes. If he accepts I ask him then what kind of cigarette, even hemp? If he says yes,
then I bring it to him for free, I do this same activity a second and third time. From there,
he becomes my friend. A soldier or a security member arrests someone depending on
your way of expressing or introducing yourself to them. In addition, you must be fast-
giving as in providing 3000 FC or 5000 FC14 to give him as transport. I often do so many
times. Afterwards I tell him about my hemp activity and the reason I am doing it. That is
why I never get arrested”. Conversations with FARDC personnel present further evidence
of the importance of these connections. As one Commander related, “I remember when I
was based in Kabinda territory… There had come a [big] grower to our camp to see our
chief. The guy brought 24 bottles of beer with a goat to tell our chief that he grows hemp
thus we should protect him. The chief agreed but told him to be giving something like a
cigarette to his soldiers so that they might not arrest him when the chief is away”. 
These  connections  are  not  only  critical  for  civilians  trading  within  a  militarized
landscape, but are crucial for army traders as well. As one FARDC informant noted, “our
safety in the trade depends on how we are living or staying with our chiefs”. Success in
the trade is consequently seen as being built from and reliant on a positive relational
outcome, one that is determined as much by cultural linkages, such as through a common
ethnicity, as through a social one. “If some soldiers are not involved or successful in the
trade it is because of how they behave when they are trading…. [when] they are too
troublesome and impolite towards the authorities,” one FARDC trader remarked, “In that
way, you cannot be successful in its trade for every time you will have problems with
your  commanders  for  you  are  rude”.  Being  “courteous”,  illustrating  displays  of
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“humility” and not being “haughty” or “impolite” were identified as important traits to
show  among  both  civilian  and  military  traders.  Behavioral  attributes  featured  as
consequential factors not only in determining whether one would be able to garner the
support of a high ranking army official but also helped determine the extent to which
one’s profits would be seized during a random arrest. “For instance, when you arrest
someone who has a lot hemp but he humiliates himself to you and asks for forgiveness,
you will reduce the cost of charging him from 80USD to 20USD… But if you arrest a trader
or grower and he does not humiliate himself to you, you will ravish the whole quantity of
hemp and in addition charge him some money according to the quantity of hemp”. Some
FARDC respondents suggested such placates by civilian traders were more important than
their drawing on other cultural ties. “Sometimes, you will come across [a civilian trader]
saying that he is a family member to a certain chief or he begins speaking in Lingala to
show you that you cannot intimidate him. For such people, we do not tolerate them. We
ravish the hemp and ask him to call his chief he boasts for”.
Even when traders are able to connect to appropriate social networks however, what
constitutes  the  appropriate  social  networks  changes  according  to  different  social
environments, which are not static. Few traders, for example, are able to access the inner
circle of top ranking FARDC officials but most admit to knowing a captain or a lieutenant
as  well  as  several  rank  and  file  army  members  that  they  collaborate  with.  These
collaborations, particularly among the rank and file, are often short lived as groups are
frequently rotated after every six months requiring that traders continuously rebuild
new ‘friendships’. Some traders rely on connections to members of rebel groups as well.
Growers in the Ruzizi Plain for example have in the past called on the FDLR whom they
frequently traded with to provide them armed escorts along part of their journey from
the rural areas to shelter them from random stops by FARDC personnel. This however has
changed as recent military movements against the group pushing them further afield
from these communities and as some informant’s argued, upsetting the previous balance
established  in  the  area  making  current  interactions  with  the  group  increasingly
dangerous. Still others draw on government administrators for protection while almost
all rely on community leaders for support. Even within official anti-drug networks, hard
lines  are  rarely  ever  drawn and  negotiation  remains  an  influential  tool  for  traders.
Labeled elsewhere as ‘institutional  connectedness’  (Claessens et  al.,  2013,  p. 14),  these
inter-personal relations then are critical to determining individuals’ success in navigating
through what is a complex and plural socio-political landscape. The ability to connect to
these networks, however is highly unequal and often reinforces existing social inequities
among  the  local  population.  For  example,  big  traders  can  readily  purchase  future
reciprocity,  through their ability to pay a more substantial “présentation des civilités”15 
while other big traders do so by means of their personal networks to higher ranking
officials and administrative staff. One such trader reflected on how his own success in the
trade was largely attributed to his connections to important regional actors including an
aunt who served as the chief of Uvira city. For traders with less capital to expend towards
such ‘gifts of reciprocity,’ or are socially marginalized, their ability to access these same
networks is severely restricted and as a result so is their ability to circumvent arrest and
the severe fines that often accompany those arrests. As one small trader recounted, “the
laws exist to us, people of the lower class, who have no defenders”. Further explained by
another small trader, “Every person without distinction who is involved in the trade is
vulnerable of pursuit since there is no exception unless you have an authority to defend
you...”. Thus while economic concerns may provide the main motivation for entering the
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trade,  to  understand  the  mechanisms  shaping the  outcomes  of  the  trade,  its
opportunities, and its restraints, requires taking a socio-political turn. 
 
Conclusion: Revisiting the Curse of the Congo
Responding to the network of informal and formal systems that emerged within Somalia’s
wider  political  environment  of  armed conflict  and criminality,  Ken Menkhaus  (2004,
p. 163) once argued, “that those systems are all but invisible to most external actors does
not make them less present or significant”. The place of marijuana in the Congo and in
particular the informal networks and systems that are drawn on and reworked therein,
draws similar parallels. The Congolese trade in cannabis sativa remains, for the most part,
a hidden economy. Just as users of the herb continue to be stigmatized, the trade in
marijuana still maintains a “fringe” (see Verbeke and Corin, 1976, p. 16916) position within
academic  debates  on  natural  resource  conflicts,  informal  economies,  and  livelihood
security. Similarly, it has yet to be able to garner the attention of most international
actors working in the region such that when asked about the cannabis economy, a UN
political affairs officer in Fizi once emphatically stated that “there is no such trade”. 
As this article has demonstrated, the presence and significance of the herb to the lives of
Congolese  and  of  its  economy  for  the  livelihood  of  Congolese  presents  a  critical
alternative perspective. Rather, Congo’s cannabis economy is in fact loaded with cultural
and economic significance. It reflects a powerful political history of Congolese resistance.
It  further  serves  as  a  key  site  for  contemporary  understanding  of  how local  people
navigate, survive, and subvert everyday forms of insecurity and violence in an enduring
and fractured landscape of armed groups and gapping inequalities. Yet its importance to
Congolese  people  and  society  has  been  overshadowed  by  outside  narratives  that
continues  to  place  the  trade  and  consumption  of  cannabis  alongside  instances  of
corruption,  crime,  greed,  abuse,  and  rape,  rather  than  food  security,  livelihoods,
reciprocity, and cost-effective (alternative) healthcare. As a result, most policies on the
cannabis economy continue to focus on the criminal aspects of the drug, which almost
inevitably reduces it to simply a vehicle for violence, underdevelopment and regional
instability. In this way, discussions of the trade in marijuana, if and when they happen, do
not  look  very  different  from  when  Melville  William  Hilton-Simpson,  writing  his
travelogue entitled “Land and Peoples of the Kasai” in 1911, singled out hemp smoking as
“the curse” of the Batetela (p. 256). Rather perhaps the real curse of Congo’s cannabis
trade is  that despite mounting evidence to the contrary regarding the causal  role of
marijuana and violence in the region, despite a growing recognition of marijuana’s role as
a legitimate (if not legal) and significant livelihood strategy for rural households across
the continent, despite evidence that the real dangers associated with the trade arguably
result not in spite of its prohibition but precisely because of it, outside observers continue
to reject empirical evidence in favor of dangerous stories (Autesserre, 2012) and toxic
discourses (Laudati and Mertens, 2019). Returning to the photographed farmer that began
this paper we can thus understand the curse of the cannabis trade another way. Perhaps
the real ‘curse’, that the farmer likely already recognizes and subsequently sought to cure
through the staging of the photograph as he did, was that we fail to see even when those
hidden economies are exposed in plain sight. 
Menkhaus.K., 2004. Vicious circles and the security development nexus in Somalia. Conflict,
Security & Development, vol. 4, n° 2, p. 149-165.
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NOTES
1. Shamba is  a  Swahili  word used by  Congolese  to  refer  to  a  plot of  land where  one  farms,
commonly translated as a ‘farm’ in English vernacular. Rather than a single plot of land, however
most farming households in the Congo tend to have multiple shambas (i.e. plots) that are spatially
diverse in order to take advantage of different geographical-ecological zones.
2. This paper uses the shorthand term cannabis, an abbreviation of the botanical name Cannabis
sativa.  I  note  here  that  Congolese  actors  use  varied  terms  for  the  plant,  reflecting  regional
language variations both across Europe and North America and within the country of the DRC
itself. For the DRC, where English is rarely spoken as French is the official language, the French
term chanvre is the term widely understood in the country, and when translated into English,
hemp is the term widely used. Among locally spoken languages, the Swahili translation, bangi, is
widely understood in the Eastern part of the country by different ethnic groups although most
languages  have  their  own  translations.  I  use  these  terms  together  with  marijuana
interchangeably throughout the text.
3. All quotes presented of local Congolese, unless otherwise noted, are drawn from the author’s
fieldwork in the DRC.
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4. While this paper does not delve into ongoing debates surrounding the drug’s contribution to
violent behavior,  that an increasing number of  states have drawn up plans to if  not already
officially legalized the drug certainly offers pause to the drug’s role as an instigator of violence.
That within the DRC, peacekeepers as well as international NGO staff are regular consumers of
the  same  drug  blamed  for  perpetrating  violence  by  armed  groups  in  the  region  presents
cautionary  evidence  against  simplistic  causal  claims  between  acts  of  violence  and  cannabis
consumption.
5. There is some debate about the exact ethnic identity of the original group. Even the origins
and translation of  the term ‘Bene Diamba’  has  been argued.  The scope of  these  debates  are
beyond the relevance of this paper however and instead references are cited here to guide the
reader to further reading on this topic.
6. Kivubo or Civubo is a disease that affects children usually under the age of one, on his/her anal
and genital area, with symptoms that include diarrhea and emaciation.
7. For an argument linking Patrice Lumumba’s use of cannabis to his eventual assassination, see
Ritchie (2012).
8. It is important to note that while previous writing has suggested that armed groups were able
to profit from the production of marijuana – in fact few groups have (and continue) to be able to
do so. As one informant noted, growing marijuana “requires peace time to deal with it”. Rebel
groups, including the national army, are rarely stationed in one place for substantial periods of
time and notably for the time that it takes for the marijuana to reach the harvesting stage. This
temporal insecurity thus prevents most groups from growing a significant quantity of marijuana
(or  any  other  agricultural  commodity).  Armed group members  that  do  grown then,  tend to
produce only small amounts close to their encampments F02D enough for personal use and small
enough not to incur a great loss in the case of forced evacuation from their base.
9. See for example; Anon., 2018 and Mupanda, 2018
10. In  2016,  reforms  made  under  the  Family  Code  removed  many  of  these  legally  binding
constraints but research suggests that these reforms have largely failed to be implemented in
practice (World Bank 2018).
11. Boules, meaning balls in French, refers to the way that the smallest quantity of marijuana
– about one ounce – are packaged – rolled up as small balls often in newspaper. 
12. From the Bafuliro language.
13. From the Bafuliro language.
14. FC stands for the local currency, Franc Congolais. This amount converts to roughly $1.83USD
and $3.06USD respectively. 
15. Translated directly from French as “presentation of civilities”, its use refers to a form of
reciprocity payment where the payer can expect, in the case of the cannabis trade, that the payee
will  advocate  on  their  behalf.  These  are  usually  provided  to  higher  ranking  officials  and
administrative staff who have the power to intervene in cases of arrest, or to help facilitate safe
passage. 
16. One of the earliest (and still few) academic surveys conducted on the use of cannabis in what
was then Zaire, the authors grouped results into three associative categories of marijuana users;
(1) violence; (2) stardom; and (3) fringe. 
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INDEX
Keywords: Narratives surrounding the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s rich natural resource
base have been largely attentive to the way that resources shape the enduring violence in the
region. Current policies regarding Congo’s cannabis trade, which advocate for its continued
prohibition, exemplify such framings. Drawing on over sixteen months of qualitative fieldwork
with those engaged in the production and trade of the drug, this paper presents a direct
challenge to the narrative of violence, delinquency, and greed that currently foregrounds most
discussions of Congo’s cannabis economy. It reframes the cannabis trade as a response to Congo’s
landscape of insecurity, rather than a symptom of it. It offers evidence of how it is rather the
plant’s illegality and the extra-legal networks its illegality engenders that are shaping the terms
of this dangerous trade. In so doing, this paper seeks to confront how we understand the very
terms of risk and insecurity as played out in the day-to-day lives of those who navigate through
the hidden economy of Congo’s cannabis trade.
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